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NMD 901087
ARM/WTP m 2/25/91

28 AUG 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY

SUBJECT: Equipment for the Berlin Garrison (U)

1. (U) In response to queries by the Secretary of Defense to Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, "What are the Facts" and "should Berlin troops be re-equipped", based on a column by Royce Drummond, 28 August 1961 - Washington Post, the following information is presented.

2. (S) Status of new equipment extracted from CINCUSAREUR2 cable of 24 August (DA IN 143334).

a. M-14 rifles, M-60 machine gun - in USAREUR depots - awaiting shipping instruction from Berlin Command.

b. M-113, Armored Personnel Carrier - Current requirement has been met by shipment of an additional 9 M-59 models, for a total of 19 in Berlin. M-113's to be shipped after shakedown in Seventh US Army.

c. M-60 - issue deferred because of limited availability of anti-personnel ammunition and to allow shakedown of equipment in Seventh US Army.

d. HU 1B helicopter - This helicopter is brand new to this theater. It is planned to equip Berlin Command with this equipment when repair parts and experience permit.

e. Katan - Berlin Command does not desire.

f. M-88 - This tank recovery weapon to be issued following Seventh US Army which is currently short of M-74's. Berlin has full complement of M-74's.

g. M-151 - First priority is to satisfy current significant shortages of 1 ton trucks in Seventh US Army combat units.

h. M-67 90mm recoilless rifle; XM72 rocket grenade; M85 cal. .50 MG - these weapons are scheduled for Berlin, but are not yet available to this command.

i. XM79 grenade launcher; Lug Nut; Davy Crockett; ADM's introduction of these weapons into Berlin is not contemplated because of political implications relative to use; limited effectiveness in type action

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contemplated; security risk involved in movement of weapons into and storage in Berlin.

3. (S) Berlin Command troops should be reequipped with new equipment, in accordance with CINCUSAREUR's projections. However, the troops must be trained to use the new equipment prior to its full issue in order to insure immediate combat readiness. Training stocks of the new rifles and machine guns have been issued to Berlin Command.

1 Incl
Excerpt from
Drummond column

BARKSDALE HAMLETT
Lieutenant General, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff
for Military Operations

EDWIN W. J. CARNS
Major General, GS
Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff
for Military Operations

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DOWNGRADED
DECLASSIFIED 10 YEARS
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Exposed Position .

S.O. to . Aite House

By Roscoe Drummond

BERLIN — How in West Berlin at the most crucial, critical, perilous, and uncertain outpost along the whole



Drummond.

periphery of C o m m u n i s t power — the crisis spot of the Western World — I have to report a grim anomaly.

I put it carefully and without exaggeration when I state that this vital, isolated U. S. garrison of only 4500 men in Berlin is inadequately equipped with modern arms and modern armor.

This is not the frangible gripe of a general who, no matter what he has, is forever demanding more.

Nor is it the impatient plea of a military man who, suffering from what Gen. George C. Marshall used to call "localitis," feels that Washington is lightly ignoring his urgent needs.

Maj. Gen. Albert Watson 2d, the United States commandant in Berlin, knows that his immediate superior, Lt. Gen. Bruce C. Clarke, commander of the U. S. forces in Europe, and their backup at the Pentagon, are quite aware of the exposed position of the Berlin garrison and of the necessity that his troops have the best, the latest, the most effective weapons. But they aren't here in adequate supply.

I wish to emphasize that neither Gen. Watson nor his aides initiated a single complaint. It took prolonged questioning to bring out that better arms and better armor from the arsenal of American production would be welcomed with relief.

FROM everything which I could learn from every source, I am convinced that Gen. Watson even underestimates, at least in conversation, his requirements.

What is true is that with a \$45 billion defense budget the Pentagon is not equipping the tiny Berlin garrison at it could.

What is true is that with a gross national product of \$500 billion the United States is not allocating to its small but all-important Berlin garrison what it should.

I am not suggesting that there are not many diverse demands upon American defense production. I am not suggesting that Washington officialdom is unaware of the special character of the Berlin outpost facing 400,000 Soviet troops, in every direction.

I am suggesting that the wheels of military and civilian bureaucracy sometimes turn inordinately slowly and that if President Kennedy orders an investigation at the highest level, he will not be satisfied with the findings.

When you figure that the Red army in East Germany could throw vastly superior manpower and firepower against the Allied forces of 12,500 men in this surrounded city, you will realize that West Berlin is a veritable "death trap."

Only taken Allied forces are here. They could be run over and completely destroyed in a day, a week, or a fortnight, depending on what the Soviets choose to do.

This fact is calmly accepted by the U. S. troops. They know they are expendable. But they know, too, that they are here for a vital military mission to make it clear to the Soviet Union that an attack on West Berlin is an attack on the United States and to do one of two other things, to force the enemy to pause before all-out war became inevitable or to enable the U. S. to have time to take the next step.

This fact is also calmly recognized by the wives and families of the officers and men stationed here. They are "army wives" and they know that theirs is a risk which cannot be avoided.

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